Blockchain-enabled vaults are not new. The first widely accessible “vault,” iEarn, launched in 2020 and later became the Yearn Finance protocol. It was a relatively simple program: it automatically reallocated a user’s digital assets across decentralized finance (“DeFi”) opportunities, so users didn’t have to execute each transaction themselves. For a thorough history of vaults, listen to Law of Code Episode 209- Vaults (Sept. 8, 2026), available here.
Vaults’ growing popularity continues to transform digital asset management practices, letting users deploy their assets through transparent, programmable infrastructure.
As regulators consider how federal securities laws apply to these arrangements, a fundamental question emerges: Should vaults be regulated based on the legal relationships they create? Or should securities law apply because of the investor protections it would bring, even where that relationship doesn’t fit?
The Digital Chamber’s Approach Starts with the Law
There is a familiar temptation to conclude that because securities regulation might better protect consumers of a particular product or service, that product or service should be classified as a security. The industry challenged expansive applications of the federal securities laws during former SEC Chair Gary Gensler’s tenure, and the importance of a careful statutory analysis remains regardless of who leads the Commission.
The required legal analysis begins with the statutory elements. Investor protections are consequences of satisfying the statutory requirements for securities regulation, not independent justifications for expanding its reach. You cannot skip the threshold requirements simply because you believe the resulting regulation would be beneficial. Expanding securities law classifications without satisfying their legal requirements could limit access, raise compliance costs, and expose existing activities to obligations designed for different relationships.
Different Risks Do Not Necessarily Mean Different Securities Classifications
Two recent policy papers illustrate this distinction. The first, published by Aave Labs, Kamino Foundation, and Veda Tech Labs (the “AKV Paper”), examines how existing securities laws apply to decentralized lending protocols and non-custodial vaults. The AKV Paper is available here. The second, published by the Crypto Council for Innovation (the “CCI Paper”), proposes a framework emphasizing human control, investor reliance, and architectural protections. The CCI Paper is available here.
Both recognize that blockchain-based financial arrangements differ from traditional products. However, they take meaningfully different approaches to fundamental legal questions. The CCI Paper places considerable emphasis on discretionary control and corresponding risks to depositors. While relevant to certain statutory inquiries, risk itself is not an element of the legal tests for determining whether something constitutes a security. That an arrangement presents risks that securities regulation could help address does not mean it should be regulated as a security.
Consider renting out a house through Airbnb, Vrbo, or directly to a long-term tenant. Each arrangement presents different operational risks, but those differences do not determine whether any of those rental arrangements constitute a securities transaction.
Similarly, a vault with immutable investment parameters presents different risks from one permitting active curation. Those distinctions deserve consideration, but they do not independently establish an investment contract, note, or investment company.
The Threshold Legal Questions
Vaults raise at least three threshold securities law questions, which The Digital Chamber’s forthcoming position paper will examine in full. Conceding more on any of them than the law requires would give up statutory defenses the industry will want back next time the regulatory climate turns hostile and could force existing service providers offshore or cause them to limit access to existing U.S. consumers.
1. Investment Contracts under Howey
Under SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., an investment contract requires an investment of money in a common enterprise with an expectation of profits derived from others’ efforts. The common-enterprise requirement is independent. Shared infrastructure, proportionate returns, or active management may be relevant facts, but none automatically establishes a collective investment undertaking. See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87–88 (2d Cir. 1994).
The AKV Paper argues that decentralized lending participants can share infrastructure and market prices without joining the fortunes in a common enterprise. It further argues that a curator directing investments within a constrained mandate does not necessarily create a separate collective investment undertaking (AKV Paper, pp. 5–7, 10–11). CCI also recognizes that common enterprise is a distinct requirement absent in many DeFi arrangements but suggests that pro rata accounting and shared losses may support horizontal commonality and treats actively managed, discretionary-strategy vaults as presenting the strongest case for investment-contract treatment (CCI Paper, pp. 39–40, 49, 75).
If the SEC adopts an approach that treats shared economic exposure or active curation as sufficient to establish a common enterprise, many curated vaults operating today could face investment-contract regulation even when their underlying assets and lending positions are not themselves securities. And because decentralized governance can change the applicable limits to lending parameters, that approach could extend Howey to DAO-governed lending protocols well beyond just curated vaults.
In The Digital Chamber’s view, treating routine curation or governance as sufficient evidence of an investment contract risks unnecessarily extending securities regulation to ordinary DeFi activities. Any position which leaves many currently existing pooled and actively curated digital asset commodity arrangements vulnerable to a common enterprise finding is suboptimal for the industry as a whole and not something The Digital Chamber supports. Instead, as provided for in case law as recently as Aguilar v. Baton Corp., managerial efforts cannot substitute for the independent requirement of a common enterprise. 2026 WL 2568764, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2026),
2. Notes under Reves
The Supreme Court’s decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young establishes the framework for determining whether a note constitutes a security. But before applying that framework, there must actually be a note. The AKV Paper explains why ordinary decentralized lending transactions do not necessarily create notes because there is generally no identifiable person issuing a debt instrument, undertaking a repayment obligation, or becoming a debtor to the supplier. (AKV Paper, pp. 8-9). The CCI Paper states that DeFi receipt tokens may not be “notes,” but concedes the “notes” issue for the purposes of its Reves analysis and focuses its discussion on whether they are non-security notes. (CCI Paper, pp. 80, 132).
While the papers agree that most DeFi lending positions are not securities, The Digital Chamber does not believe the law supports skipping the threshold question of whether a note exists at all in these software interactions. Doing so risks expanding securities law to apply to software in ways that were never intended.
3. Investment Companies under the Investment Company Act
The Investment Company Act similarly requires establishing the existence of an issuer before determining whether that issuer qualifies as an investment company. The AKV Paper makes a compelling case that users of qualifying non-custodial vaults generally retain enforceable interests in underlying assets and independent redemption rights, which means receipt tokens are not “issued” but reflect those retained interests in the underlying assets, rather than representing securities issued by a separate fund. (AKV Paper, pp. 11-13). CCI recognizes the threshold issuer question, but suggests that a “no-issuer” argument may be unavailable where a vault is actively curated (CCI Paper, pp. 111–119). The CCI Paper’s positions surrounding levels of active curation (if accepted by the SEC) potentially expose curated vaults to Investment Company Act requirements.
There is a fundamental distinction in the law between an investment adviser and an investment company that must be addressed in any analysis of vaults, actively curated or not. Pooled infrastructure, proportionate returns, or an investment adviser does not necessarily establish a separate issuing investment undertaking. The Digital Chamber believes the existence of an issuer must still be established, not assumed, from the presence of investment management.
The Risk of Premature Concessions on These Threshold Legal Questions
Some argue the pragmatic play is to accept broader securities classifications and then negotiate for exemptions or tailored compliance pathways. That trade is a bad one. The industry should not surrender strong statutory defenses in exchange for arguments that depend on regulators’ goodwill. These types of concessions risk the SEC taking an avoidably expansive view of their jurisdiction which creates regulatory exposure for existing DeFi protocols and curated vaults, including arrangements unable to comply with requirements designed for traditional issuers and funds.
Industry advocates have a responsibility to make the strongest legally supportable case against the application of unwarranted regulation, while proposing regulated pathways in the alternative. Otherwise, we risk conceding jurisdiction unnecessarily and leaving the industry’s future dependent on narrower defenses or the SEC’s willingness to grant relief.
This concern is informed by experience. For years, the SEC advanced interpretations of Howey claiming common enterprise was not a separate element of the investment contract test. It was only after years of industry challenge that the SEC recently changed its view on the subject in its March 2026 interpretation (91 Fed. Reg. 13,714 (Mar. 23, 2026)). The example illustrates why arguments grounded in statutory text and case law should remain part of the industry’s advocacy, even when the industry is uncertain whether regulators will be receptive.
Securities Classification Should Not Penalize Protocols That Protect Users
Immutability has its place, but it’s not right for every product or user. DeFi protocols routinely adjust interest rates, loan-to-value ratios, liquidation thresholds, and collateral parameters. Curators similarly rebalance positions, reduce exposure to deteriorating markets, and implement protective restrictions. These are all activities which reduce risk for users and should be encouraged.
A framework that treats adaptive governance or risk management as grounds for securities classification could discourage precisely those safeguards most important to user safety and proliferation of these technologies. Federal securities law currently does not impose immutability as a condition for remaining outside its jurisdiction. Doing so now could result in developers making decisions which are not the best for the individual user simply to avoid triggering securities laws.
This does not mean curators are categorically exempt from regulation. But an investment adviser does not automatically create an investment company. Vault software which programmatically “holds” securities does not automatically issue securities. And authority to direct deployment of assets does not necessarily establish custody.
Each question requires its own legal analysis and simply basing regulatory standards on immutability risks doing more harm to DeFi and its users than the benefits that could come from a framework which provides certainty but substantially limits user optionality.
Finding Common Ground
Despite these divergent approaches, meaningful opportunities for collaboration remain. The Digital Chamber supports recognizing non-custodial architecture, distinguishing infrastructure providers from regulated intermediaries, and establishing workable compliance pathways where securities laws apply.
Some vaults may intentionally operate as registered investment funds, with entities acquiring portfolios and issuing securities representing interests in those vehicles. The CCI Paper offers valuable recommendations for adapting regulatory requirements to those arrangements.
But those solutions should supplement, not replace, the threshold analysis. Regulators must establish that statutory requirements are satisfied before imposing securities law obligations. Infrastructure providers, curators, custodians, and issuers should be evaluated according to their actual activities and legal relationships. And the SEC should accommodate blockchain technology’s distinctive characteristics without expanding its statutory jurisdiction.
Securities laws serve important investor protection purposes, but those purposes do not authorize regulators to extend the statutes past the boundaries Congress set. The future of blockchain-enabled finance should not depend on persuading regulators that every new arrangement deserves an exemption. It should start with a simpler question: does securities regulation apply at all?
To learn more about The Digital Chamber’s vault advocacy or to contribute to our forthcoming position paper, please contact policy@digitalchamber.org.