Monkeys to Machine: How Copyright Adapted to AI

By: William McLees

Just shy of 10 years ago, a crested macaque monkey in the jungles of Indonesia pressed the shutter button of a photographer’s camera, taking a selfie of himself smiling. The ensuing photo went on to be massively viral and sparked a unique debate: Who owns the picture if a human didn’t take it?

Close-up selfie of a crested macaque with dark fur and amber eyes, smiling broadly against a blurred green jungle background.
Figure 1. The “monkey selfie” taken by Naruto, a crested macaque, in Indonesia.

The Supreme Court answered this in the landmark case Naruto the Monkey v. Slater (2018). The case asked the question: if copyright laws serve to “promote the progress of science and useful arts” by granting “authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”, as outlined in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution, then how could a non-human (or in this case, a monkey) fulfill those requirements? The argument made on behalf of Naruto was that he had “constitutional standing” to the ownership of his own likeness; however, the counterargument responded that he may not have the ability to file for Copyright under the Copyright Act of 1976. Though it may not come as a surprise, the Supreme Court decided that “this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act”.

What makes this significant is how this case shaped future copyright debates, namely, those concerning Artificial Intelligence and artificially generated images. As a result of the previous ruling that copyright can only be held and created by a human, Naruto v. Slater serves as precedent for a much more recent case. In 2024, computer scientist and copyright theorist Dr. Steven Thaler asked the US Copyright Office to register and protect his artwork, “A Recent Entrance to Paradise”. The only problem: Dr. Thaler’s own AI System called “the Creativity Machine” had generated the image entirely on its own, and Dr. Thaler listed it as the sole author in the official registration documents. The Office denied his application for copyright registration, and upon appeal, found itself in court with Thaler.

AI-generated image of an overgrown railway track leading into a stone tunnel, surrounded by purple flowers and dense green foliage.
Figure 2. “A Recent Entrance to Paradise,” generated by Dr. Steven Thaler’s AI system, the Creativity Machine.

It was quickly ruled and upheld that “the Creativity Machine cannot be the recognized author of a copyrighted work because the Copyright Act of 1976 requires all eligible works to be authored in the first instance by a human being,” despite the appellant’s argument that “he is the work’s author by virtue of making and using the Creativity Machine”. Using the same logic used to deny Naruto his copyright, the courts denied the Creativity Machine’s (and therefore Thaler’s) copyright.

Although Thaler’s story ends there, it raises an interesting question. If the law allowed an AI model to hold copyright of the work it creates, who would hold the limited monopoly the copyright provides: the person who built the machine, or the machine itself?

As copyright legislation continues to grow and adapt to the rise of AI and other complicated technologies, it is important to remember the origins of these rights. The Constitution guarantees these protections to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. Therefore, it should be of the highest priority to speak with Congress in constructive and progressive dialogues that meet the demands these technologies create. For instance, one demand of AI technology is on our energy infrastructure and data storage. In turn, it is up to our government to support this growing demand and, more importantly, ensure the proper measures of guidance and regulation are in place for such development to be effective and safe.

We dive more into how U.S. governance frameworks are still evolving to keep pace with these rapidly advancing technologies on our Artificial Intelligence & Quantum page here.

There are many ways that legislators can attempt to reconcile these conflicting issues. They could choose to simply revisit the Copyright Act itself, given how much the digital world has changed in the past 50 years since the act was written, or simply abandon it in favor of a new system. Regardless, lawmakers must balance previous rulings and established judicial precedent with the rapidly changing landscape of technology development. It is fair to say that this problem will not be resolved overnight, and we can expect many more years of litigation before a clear legal picture is painted.

Sources

  • Naruto v. Slater (2018)
  • Thaler v. Perlmutter (2024)
  • TDC Digital Ownership Policy & AI Policy

Reach out to Policy@digitalchamber.org with any questions or comments. 

TDC Applauds OCC Rules Advancing GENIUS Act Implementation

The Digital Chamber applauds the OCC for issuing final rules implementing the GENIUS Act, expected to take effect in January 2027. Through continued stakeholder engagement, the OCC is helping ensure the United States remains the digital finance capital of the world and payment stablecoins reinforce U.S. dollar dominance. We are pleased to see several of TDC’s recommendations reflected in the final rules, including narrowing the “yield prohibition” to align with Congressional intent, giving digital asset service providers the flexibility to offer services needed to compete, and not requiring identification of secondary-market stablecoin holders. TDC and its members look forward to continued engagement with the OCC and fellow regulators as implementation continues.

For any inquiries, please contact TDC at press@digitalchamber.org.

Stablecoins and Monetary Sovereignty: What George Mason’s New Research Shows 

By: Jean-Phillippe Beaudet

What happened

This summer, a student research team at George Mason University’s Costello College of Business Future of Finance Lab (FFL) tested whether stablecoin growth shows up in the money supply, bond yields, and U.S. Treasury holdings of 25 countries. The paper, “Assessing the Influence of Stablecoin Adoption on Dollar Dominance from Cross-Country and Monetary Data,” comes from Sarah Dalmet, Aiden Lee, Christina Liu, Mishka Kandhari, and FFL’s Derek Horstmeyer, PhD. It draws on new country-level stablecoin data from Allium and monthly figures that run from mid-2021 to mid-2026.

TDC thanks the authors, and Dr. Horstmeyer in particular, who walked TDC through the results. The team assembled the data and ran the regressions in about three months.

What they found

Country by country, stablecoin growth showed no clear relationship with narrow money (M1), and no sign that stablecoins displace direct holdings of U.S. Treasuries. Bond yields produced isolated results at most. A pooled regression across all countries also found no relationship.

Chart of country-level results from the Future of Finance Lab study, with one dot per country row in the paper’s results table.
Figure 1. Each dot is one country row in the paper’s results table. Source: Table 1, Dalmet et al. (2026).

One result held up. In Indonesia, Romania, Singapore, and Taiwan, stablecoin growth moved with broad money (M2). Dr. Horstmeyer was careful on two points: (1) this is an association, not causation and, (2) the team’s working read runs from money → stablecoins (when a country’s money supply grows, residents convert more of it into dollar stablecoins). The team cannot yet explain why these four countries stood out – a long decline in the local currency was the first idea, but it does not fit Singapore’s economic conditions.

Why it matters

Two findings bear directly on our work. The first is the direction of the M2 result. If new local money is flowing into dollar stablecoins, residents are converting at the margin. They are not draining existing deposits – the bank-funding risk the IMF flagged last December. The second is the null on Treasury holdings. The data show no sign that savers who buy dollar stablecoins buy fewer Treasuries directly, which is consistent with what we noted in 2024: stablecoins add to global demand for the dollar and lower U.S. borrowing costs.

TDC’s view

The study does not test our tariff argument. It has no exchange rate outcome, no tariff episodes, and country-specific data access is still growing. Null results across 25 countries cannot rule out a channel that operates under stress in a few economies.

Our hypothesis that dollar stablecoins act as geoeconomic tools in trade rate disputes stays open, and the study window predates the changes ahead. The GENIUS Act takes full effect by January 2027, and cross-border stablecoin value more than doubled between January 2025 and June 2026. We will not put a date on when the channel shows up in national data, but Dr. Horstmeyer suggested running these tests again in about four years to capture impacts after more significant market penetration.

With roughly 100 country-level tests, a few significant results can appear by chance. We read the M2 pattern as a lead worth chasing, and the team plans to keep chasing it.

What’s next

The Future of Finance Lab plans to keep building on this work with more complete data and a path to causal identification, and Dr. Horstmeyer’s team expects the picture to look different as the series lengthens. We are talking with our global developments team about where to look next.

If your organization has data, questions, or funding that could help, FFL wants to hear from you. TDC also welcomes researchers willing to do the hard work of testing emerging tech hypotheses, so that policy on the Hill rests on facts. FFL’s research collection also covers cross-border payments, how AI agents choose between stablecoins, and perpetual futures trading. The full paper and the collection are available on the Future of Finance Lab website.

Reach out to Policy@digitalchamber.org with any questions or comments. 

Can Countries Devalue Their Way Out of U.S. Tariffs? 

By: Jean-Phillippe Beaudet

The legal footing under U.S. tariffs has shifted twice this year. The Supreme Court struck down IEEPA tariffs on February 20, 2026. A Section 122 stopgap expired on July 24, and the same day USTR imposed Section 301 tariffs on 60 economies, at 10% or 12.5% depending on their forced labor import rules. While rates moved, strategic responses did not. A country hit by U.S. tariffs has always had one reliable answer – devaluing its own currency – and dollar stablecoins now give that country’s savers a way around it.

How the currency defense works

Countries targeted by tariffs usually weaken their currencies, which cheapens exports and offsets the tax. The math is simple (Figure 1). Fully offsetting a tariff of t takes a depreciation of:

d= t1 + t

A 12.5% tariff takes about 11%. A 46% tariff takes about 32%. China’s 145% peak in April 2025 would have taken about 59%. In 2018, Brookings’ Robin Brooks wrote, the average U.S. tariff on China was 12.5% and the yuan fell almost exactly as much, a de facto full offset. (Figure 2)

Line chart: how much a currency must fall to cancel a tariff. An 11% depreciation offsets a 12.5% tariff, 32% offsets 46%, and 59% offsets 145%.
Figure 1. Depreciation needed for a full offset equals t / (1 + t). Source: author’s calculation.
China’s official dollar/yuan fix with its 2% band, 2012 to 2024, highlighting the 2018 Trump tariff devaluation. Drivers of China’s official FX reserve accumulation, 2010 to 2024, highlighting 2015–16 capital flight.
Figure 2 (Left). China’s official $/CNY fix, 2012 to 2024. Source: Bloomberg, via Robin Brooks, Brookings, January 16, 2025.
Figure 3 (Right). Drivers of China’s official FX reserve accumulation, 2010 to 2024. Source: Haver Analytics, via Robin Brooks, Brookings, January 16, 2025.

China and Vietnam both utilized the same tool in 2025. The yuan fell to its weakest level since 2007 on April 9, and the State Bank of Vietnam guided the dong to a record low of 26,436 per dollar in August.

Depreciation has a price the exporter does not pay. It cuts the value of local savings, and savers who expect depreciation move their money into other assets as avenues become available. China saw this in 2015 and 2016, when depreciation fears drove capital flight through bank-intermediated channels despite strict controls. (Figure 3)

Stablecoins open a new exit

In November 2024, The Digital Chamber published How Stablecoins Are Extending U.S. Dollar Dominance. My co-authors and I flagged an implication that deserves a fresh test:

While foreign leaders may seek to diversify their economies and reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar to retain policy independence and shield against U.S. geopolitical maneuvering… those countries’ citizens are increasingly prioritizing acceptance, stability, liquidity, and the backing of a strong referent currency. Stablecoins allow users to realize this preference for U.S. dollars.

A government that weakens its currency is betting that savers stay put. Dollar stablecoins give them an exit pathway. About 97% of stablecoin issuance is dollar-pegged. A July BIS working paper found that stablecoin flows appear largely unaffected by capital controls, and that they share their drivers with old-style dollar deposits: exchange rate dynamics and financial crises. In Vietnam, USDT averaged a 3.35% premium in 2024, and about 7.8% of remittances arrive as stablecoins.

How big is the leak?

Right now? Small, and growing from almost nothing. The IMF reports that stablecoin holdings rose from virtually zero in 2020 to 1.5% of total deposits in Africa and the Middle East and 2.7% in Latin America and the Caribbean by 2024. Chainalysis finds that monthly cross-border stablecoin value more than doubled, from $11 billion in January 2025 to $24 billion in June 2026. The IMF treats lost control of domestic liquidity as a risk that arrives once a significant share of activity shifts. We are not there yet, but there is a trend.

Bar chart: stablecoin holdings as a share of total deposits in 2024 — 1.5% in Africa and the Middle East, 2.7% in Latin America and the Caribbean, up from virtually zero in 2020.
Figure 4. Stablecoin holdings as a share of total deposits, 2024. Source: IMF, Understanding Stablecoins, December 2025 (Figure 8).

States already see the threat

Governments increasingly are identifying dollar stablecoins as a sovereignty problem. China bans crypto outright. Vietnam’s licensed pilot requires settlement solely in dong and limits tokenized assets to those backed by real assets, which keeps dollar stablecoins out of the legal market. Permissionless architectures complicate this, though – licensing governs exchanges, but can’t govern wallets directly.

TDC’s view

This is a statecraft question, rather than a market question. Dollar stablecoins extend U.S. monetary reach into economies at odds with Washington, regardless of the tech’s intended design. Tariff targets assume they can answer with currency devaluation, and that assumption now may no longer be safe.

We cannot yet point to a tariff that stablecoins neutralized, and the first systematic data, from George Mason University, shows no aggregate effect so far. But the exit exists and volumes are rising. Policymakers weighing tariffs should treat the currency defense as weaker than it was in 2018.

The cost of this capability lands unevenly, and this tradeoff is often not made explicit. Washington gains deeper demand for dollars. Savers in tariffed economies gain protection from depreciation their governments engineered. Those governments lose room to direct their own monetary policy, and the savers adopt issuer and platform risk that deposit insurance does not cover. Dollar stablecoins are not neutral infrastructure – they are inseparable from U.S. geoeconomic statecraft.

What’s next

GENIUS is law. President Trump signed it on July 18, 2025, its core provisions take effect by January 18, 2027, and Treasury’s August proposal on unlawful issuance is open for comment until October 19. Supply sits near $300 billion, off a May peak near $310 billion.

Treasury’s final GENIUS rules will decide how foreign users and foreign issuers fit into the system. States in trade disputes with Washington will answer with their own licensing rules, capital controls, and state digital currencies, and each will struggle to overcome the capabilities introduced by digital assets and sovereign wallets. In a follow-up post, we look at new country-level research from George Mason University’s Future of Finance Lab that tests whether stablecoin growth shows up in money supply, bond yields, and Treasury holdings.

Sources

  • U.S. Trade Representative, “USTR Takes Action in Forced Labor Section 301 Investigations,” July 23, 2026. Effective date (12:01 a.m. ET, July 24, 2026): RV Industry Association, https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/section-122-tariffs-replaced-new-section-301-forced-labor-tariffs. IEEPA ruling date: USA-ASEAN Business Council (link in text). April 2025 46% rate for Vietnam: Executive Order 14257, April 2, 2025.
  • The Digital Chamber, “How Stablecoins Are Extending U.S. Dollar Dominance,” November 17, 2024.
  • Robin Brooks, “China, tariffs, and Trump 2.0,” Brookings Institution, January 16, 2025 (Figures 5 and 8 reproduced from this article).
  • Reuters, “Yuan Falls to 2007 Lows as US Tariffs on China Kick In,” April 9, 2025. The Investor (Vietnam), “Challenges for Vietnam’s monetary policy in 2026.”
  • Tiger Research, “Stablecoins as Vietnam’s Parallel Financial System,” May 20, 2025.
  • International Monetary Fund, “Understanding Stablecoins,” Departmental Paper, December 2, 2025.
  • Boris Hofmann, Aaron Mehrotra, and Jan Paulick, “Dollarisation and monetary control: what lessons for the rise of stablecoins?,” BIS Working Papers No. 1370, July 21, 2026.
  • Chainalysis, “2026 Global Crypto Adoption Index,” September 23, 2026.
  • Resolution 05/2025/NQ-CP (Vietnam), as summarized by ASL Gate and Russin & Vecchi.
  • Sullivan & Cromwell, “Treasury Department Proposes Rules Clarifying GENIUS Act Prohibitions,” August 2026.
  • Forbes, “The Stablecoin Market Shrank For The First Time In Four Years,” July 27, 2026; CryptoTimes, “Stablecoin Market Reaches $300.9B as Tron Gains $5B in Q3,” October 2, 2026 (RWA Foundation and Token Terminal data as of October 1, 2026).

Reach out to Policy@digitalchamber.org with any questions or comments. 

TDC Celebrates The SEC’s Step Forward on Custody Rules Modernization

The SEC continues to deliver on its promise to innovate the regulatory landscape. This proposed rulemaking represents a landmark step forward, bringing the custody rules under the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act into alignment with today’s digital asset markets.

We are pleased to see many of the recommendations made in our Crypto Task Force RFI responses reflected in the proposing release. Chief among them: (1) permitting state-chartered trusts to serve as qualified custodians, (2) allowing investment advisers and investment companies to self-custody digital assets under certain circumstances, and (3) update the recordkeeping and disclosure obligations for advisers and regulated funds.

Yesterday’s proposing release joins a growing body of recent SEC rulemakings reshaping the U.S. digital asset ecosystem to position the United States as the world’s leading hub for crypto innovation. We’re proud to stand alongside the SEC as it charts this new regulatory path forward.

For any inquiries, please contact TDC at press@digitalchamber.org.

One Year of the GENIUS Act  

One year ago, on July 18, 2025, President Trump signed the GENIUS Act into law, transforming how stablecoins (digital assets pegged to the U.S. dollar) are regulated in the U.S.  The law established a clear federal framework for stablecoins and became part of history as the first major piece of crypto legislation ever signed into law in the U.S.  

The GENIUS Act requires stablecoin issuers to maintain 1:1 reserves in safe assets such as U.S. dollars and short-term Treasuries, publish monthly reports, and comply with anti-money laundering rules. The trust that comes with knowing there is strong federal oversight for stablecoins has been a key unlock to the growth of the asset class. 

The Results 

When the rules became clear, people began building. Major companies took notice almost immediately; Visa, Mastercard, J.P. Morgan, and more integrated or announced stablecoin payment products following the law’s passage. 

  • The global stablecoin market has reached $315 billion in market capitalization in 2026, more than 50% growth from the $206 billion market cap at the beginning of 2025.  
  • Annual global transaction volume surged to nearly $35 trillion in 2025, a figure that rivals major credit card networks.  
  • Real-world stablecoin payments, including businesses paying suppliers, families sending money home, people buying goods, and more, have doubled in a single year to $390 billion. 

Beyond our Borders 

The ripple effect from Washington went global; regulators everywhere watched the U.S. draw clear lines and started drawing their own. 

Stablecoin adoption has been particularly transformative in Latin America. As detailed in Latin America’s Surge in the Global Race to Adopt Stablecoins, the region has become a global leader in stablecoin usage, driven by people seeking to protect their savings from inflation, send remittances cheaply, and access dollar-denominated accounts without a U.S. bank. This effectively turns the citizens in those countries into buyers of U.S. Treasuries and depositors into U.S. bank accounts. The GENIUS Act’s clear framework accelerated this by giving international users and issuers confidence that dollar-backed stablecoins were built on solid ground. 

  • Australia introduced stablecoin legislation in late 2025 and adopted it in April 2026, treating stablecoins as regulated payment products and requiring compliance with standard Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) regulations. 
  • The EU’s MiCA regulation paved the way for licensed euro-backed stablecoins; Decta’s 2025 report noting that monthly transaction volume rose 899% after MiCA’s rollout. 
  • The Asia-Pacific region is racing to be a hub for regulated digital finance, with frameworks such as Hong Kong’s Project Ensemble, South Korea’s Capital Markets and Electronic Securities Acts, Singapore’s Project Guardian, and more. 
  • Stablecoins now account for roughly 43% of all crypto transaction volume in Sub-Saharan Africa, where people use dollar-pegged digital assets to protect their savings from local-currency inflation. 
  • The Bank of England in the UK revised its pound sterling stablecoin proposal, eliminating a £200,000 limit on individual holders and raising the issuance cap to £40 billion.  

The Takeaway 

Clear rules don’t slow innovation down. They speed it up. Before the GENIUS Act, banks and institutions often wouldn’t touch stablecoins for fear that investments would be lost to shifting regulatory winds. And developers couldn’t build products if they didn’t know whether those products were legal. 

When the U.S. defined the rules of the road, the market responded, and that’s exactly why finishing the job with a market structure bill like the Clarity Act matters now. The GENIUS Act addressed the questions surrounding stablecoins, but the U.S. has yet to clearly define where Bitcoin, Ethereum, and thousands of other digital assets fit within our regulatory system.  

We are closer than ever to market structure rules of the road. The House passed a version of a market structure bill last year. The Senate Banking Committee advanced its portion of the bill in May 2026, just months after the Senate Agriculture Committee passed its portion of the bill. Negotiations are actively blending those bills, so the full Senate can continue pushing the bill towards the President’s desk. 

One year in, the lesson of the GENIUS Act is clear: America leads when it sets standards. The world follows when we do. Now is the time to build on that momentum and set the standard for market structure and asset control. Done right, the rule can support effective enforcement while giving responsible PPSIs the clarity they need to build in the United States. 

Stablecoin Rules Must Match How Stablecoins Actually Work 

The Digital Chamber submitted a comment letter to FinCEN and OFAC regarding their proposed rule on AML/CFT and sanctions compliance program requirements for permitted payment stablecoin issuers. 

Bringing permitted payment stablecoin issuers, or PPSIs, into a clear BSA/AML framework helps consumers feel confident, helps firms do their part to protect the U.S. financial system and support law enforcement. 

At the same time, TDC urged FinCEN and OFAC to clarify the final rule so it reflects how payment stablecoins actually operate. The key point is simple: issuing a payment stablecoin is not the same as intermediating every transaction in which that stablecoin is later used. 

Why It Matters 

Payment stablecoins can strengthen U.S. payments, expand access to dollar-denominated digital value, and support responsible innovation. The current proposed rules could create obligations that no issuer can realistically meet. 

TDC’s letter focuses on several core points: 

  • PPSIs should be responsible for their own direct activities, such as issuance, redemption, custody, hosted wallet services, or other customer-facing services. 
  • PPSIs should not be required to monitor, report on, or serve as the compliance intermediary for all secondary-market activity merely because they issued the stablecoin. 
  • Recordkeeping, Travel Rule, SAR, and sanctions obligations should apply to the entity with the customer relationship, transaction role, custody, control, or legal ability to act. 
  • Blockchain analytics, digital identity, ecosystem monitoring, and AI-enabled tools can improve compliance, but they should not create broad secondary-market surveillance duties for PPSIs. 
  • FinCEN and OFAC should provide clearer guidance on when PPSIs must block, freeze, reject, seize, burn, or otherwise prevent transfers. 
  • Regulators should account for downstream risks to innocent users when stablecoins are frozen, seized, or burned inside decentralized protocols, liquidity pools, automated market makers, or other shared on-chain systems. 

TDC’s Take 

TDC supports strong AML/CFT and sanctions compliance for stablecoin issuers. But compliance obligations must be tied to the role an issuer actually plays. 

When a PPSI directly issues or redeems stablecoins for a customer, it can collect information, screen wallets, use blockchain analytics, conduct due diligence, and maintain records. But once a stablecoin moves through exchanges, custodians, merchants, self-custodied wallets, decentralized protocols, or smart contracts, the issuer often does not know the sender or recipient, does not hold the customer’s assets, and does not control the transaction. 

That distinction matters when regulators require an issuer to freeze, seize, burn, or restrict stablecoins. In a custodial setting, that action may affect a specific account or wallet. In a decentralized liquidity pool or automated market maker, the same action could disrupt pricing, liquidity, collateral, or protocol operations for users with no connection to the enforcement target. 

TDC also urged FinCEN and OFAC to provide safe harbors or mitigating-factor treatment for PPSIs that act in good faith to comply with lawful orders while taking reasonable steps to limit harm to innocent users, liquidity providers, protocol participants, and other third parties. 

Taken together, these stablecoin compliance recommendations will create rules that are both strong and workable. 

What’s Next 

TDC will continue working with regulators and industry to ensure the final rule aligns realistic compliance obligations with customer relationships and asset control. Done right, the rule can support effective enforcement while giving responsible PPSIs the clarity they need to build in the United States. 

TDC CEO Testifies at Senate Banking Hearing Entitled: The Affordability Agenda

Cody Carbone
Chief Executive Officer, The Digital Chamber
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Hearing Entitled: “The Affordability Agenda”
Tuesday, June 23, 2026


Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Warren, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

My name is Cody Carbone, and I serve as Chief Executive Officer of The Digital Chamber, the world’s largest digital asset and blockchain trade association. Founded in 2014, our members include more than 250 companies globally across the digital asset and blockchain ecosystem, including exchanges, custodians, infrastructure providers, banks, developers, investors, and emerging technology companies working to build a safer, more competitive, and more inclusive financial system.

I am here today to offer solutions to the challenge of affordability weighing on Americans. The cost of accessing, moving, saving, and investing money should not be a barrier to any of these basic economic activities. The goal of the digital asset industry is to make it as easy to send money as it is to send an email.

For too long, American consumers and small businesses have been forced to operate on financial rails that are slow, expensive, and often difficult to access. These costs rarely appear as a single line item on a receipt, but they show up everywhere: in the price of groceries, in fees charged to small businesses, in the cost of sending money to family abroad, in the delay between earning a paycheck and being able to use it, and in the thousands of dollars families
must pay to close on a home.

That is the hidden affordability problem digital assets can help solve.

Digital assets and blockchain technology will not, on their own, slow inflation, increase the housing supply or wages, or fix every cost pressure facing Americans. But they can reduce the impact of friction and fees and offer competitive alternatives across the global financial system.

This matters most for households with the least room for error. The Federal Reserve reported in May 2026 that only 63 percent of adults could cover a hypothetical $400 emergency expense using cash, savings, or the equivalent – meaning more than one-third could not do so without borrowing, selling something, or being unable to cover the expense at all. 1The same survey found that 59 percent of adults had at least one major unexpected expense in the prior 12 months, with major vehicle repairs, home or appliance repairs, and major medical expenses among the most common.2

The FDIC’s most recent national household survey found that 4.2 percent of U.S. households – approximately 5.6 million households – were unbanked in 2023, while another 14.2 percent – approximately 19 million households – were underbanked.3 These are the Americans most likely to rely on costly, high-interest stopgap measures such as check cashing, money orders, payday loans, pawn shops, and other nonbank financial services.

Even for banked consumers, delays and fees are real and costly. Consumers paid more than $5.8 billion in overdraft and nonsufficient-fund fees in 2023, even after many institutions reduced those charges from pre-pandemic levels.4 And under Regulation CC, funds from many local checks generally do not have to be made fully available until the second business day after deposit, with only the first $275 generally required to be available by the first business day.5 For a household living paycheck to paycheck, that delay is not an inconvenience. It is a cost.

Digital assets can help lower costs in three areas to directly address the challenge of affordability: cross-border payments, everyday merchant payments, and the transfer and ownership of assets.

First, digital assets can reduce the cost of cross-border money transfers.

The United States is the largest source of remittances in the world. The International Organization for Migration has reported that the United States has consistently been the top remittance-sending country, and World Bank bilateral estimates have placed U.S. outward remittance flows at approximately $200 billion in a recent year.

6Globally, remittances to lowand middle-income countries were estimated to reach $685 billion in 2024 and were forecast by
the World Bank to reach approximately $690 billion in 2025.7

The World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide database reported that the global average cost of sending remittances was 6.36 percent in its latest available report, more than double the international target of 3 percent.8 At that price, a worker sending $200 home may lose more than $12 to fees before the money even reaches the intended recipient. Across hundreds of billions of dollars in global remittances, those fees represent a significant economic loss for working families.

The problem is that cross-border payments often depend on multiple parties, different systems, different time zones, currency conversion, compliance checks, and settlement processes that were not designed for the modern digital economy. GENIUS Act regulated US dollar-backed stablecoins can help reduce that friction.

A payment stablecoin can move value globally, around the clock, over blockchain-based infrastructure. While on-ramps, off-ramps, foreign exchange, compliance, custody, and wallet services may still involve costs, the underlying payment rail tends to be faster, more
transparent, and more efficient than many legacy cross-border systems.

The same problem affects American freelancers, contractors, and small businesses. For example, a designer in South Carolina working for a client in Europe, a software developer in Arizona paid by a company in Asia, or a manufacturer in Ohio paying an overseas supplier all face the same basic problem: global payments are slow and expensive, creating a burden on those working to innovate and grow much-needed jobs in their communities.

That is why business-to-business payments have become a fast-growing real-world use case for stablecoins. McKinsey estimated in February 2026 that B2B stablecoin payments accounted for roughly $226 billion, or about 60 percent of global stablecoin payment volume, and that B2B stablecoin payments had increased 733 percent year over year.9 Artemis, Castle Island Ventures, and Dragonfly similarly found significant growth in stablecoin payment activity, including B2B use cases such as treasury operations and cross-border settlement.10

Businesses are using these tools because the payment rails are secure and fast. Lower-cost cross-border payments make American workers and American businesses more competitive, and all American consumers deserve access to these innovations.


Second, digital assets can put competitive pressure on the cost of everyday payments.


Federal Reserve data show how central card payments have become to everyday commerce. In 2024, credit cards accounted for 35 percent of consumer payments by number, and debit cards accounted for another 30 percent. Cash accounted for 14 percent.11

The cost of accepting card payments is material. In a 2025 report, the Government Accountability Office found that selected federal entities collected approximately $43.6 billion from consumers using credit, debit, and other payment cards in fiscal year 2023 and paid approximately $784 million in related fees. Those fees equaled 1.8 percent of revenue, and interchange fees accounted for nearly 90 percent of the fees paid by those entities.12

Federal Reserve data also show that payment network fees are significant. In 2023, network fees to all parties in debit card transactions increased to $12.95 billion, and acquirers and merchants paid 64.9 percent of those network fees.13

For large businesses, payment acceptance costs are a major operating expense. For small businesses operating on thin margins, they can be especially difficult to absorb. And because payment costs are part of doing business, they can affect prices, margins, wages, investment, and consumer choice.

Blockchain-based payment rails can introduce another option.

A regulated dollar-backed stablecoin can settle faster and often at lower cost than many traditional payment methods. Stripe, for example, lists stablecoin payment acceptance at 1.5 percent of the transaction amount in U.S. dollars, including conversion to fiat, wallet and AML screening, fraud prevention, and gas sponsorship.14 Stripe has also stated that stablecoin transfers typically incur flat network fees, often measured in pennies, and that for certain
businesses, stablecoin payments can cost about half as much as other payment methods.15

Properly regulated dollar-backed stablecoins can allow certain payments to settle faster, with greater transparency, and with a different cost structure than legacy payment systems. They should not replace cards, cash, ACH, wire transfers, or other payment methods. Different payment methods serve different needs, and consumers should be empowered with the best choices possible for their individual needs and preferences.

A cheaper, faster, compliant payment rail can give merchants more choices. It can allow businesses to experiment with lower-cost payment options. It can create pressure for incumbent payment systems to improve. And over time, greater competition in payments can benefit consumers.

It is also consistent with the way American markets work best. When a new rail can move the same dollar more efficiently, the answer should not be to block it. The answer should be to regulate it properly, supervise it effectively, and allow responsible market participants to compete.

That competition matters for small businesses. A family-owned restaurant, a local grocery store, a contractor, a barber shop, or an online seller may not have the bargaining power of a national retailer. Safer, more compliant, lower-cost options position businesses better to compete, invest, hire, and serve their customers.

Consumers benefit when payment systems compete, especially when innovation happens under U.S. rules, rather than in offshore markets where American regulators have less visibility to protect consumers.

Because of this Committee’s leadership, Congress has already taken a major step. The GENIUS Act created a federal framework for payment stablecoins, including requirements for reserve backing, public reserve disclosures, supervision, and compliance. That framework can help give consumers, businesses, banks, and regulators greater confidence that payment stablecoins are backed, redeemable, supervised, and compliant.16

Third, digital assets can reduce barriers to owning and transferring assets.

Tokenization is the process of representing ownership, rights, or claims on a blockchain. That can include financial assets, such as funds, bonds, Treasuries, private credit, collateral, and commodities. But it can also include real estate interests, invoices, receivables, warehouse receipts, supply chain records, intellectual property royalties, energy credits, and other records of ownership or entitlement.

That matters because today, too many markets still rely on fragmented, paper records and duplicative processes. One system records ownership. Another verifies documents. Another sends payment instructions. Another clears the transaction. Another settles it. Another reconciles the records after the fact.


Tokenization can help reduce that friction by allowing ownership records, transfer instructions, payment, settlement, and verification to operate through a shared digital infrastructure. That can mean clearer records, faster settlement, stronger auditability, fewer duplicative checks, and lower administrative costs.

This matters across the economy.

For funds and securities, tokenization can make issuance, subscriptions, redemptions, transfer agency functions, and investor recordkeeping more efficient.

For Treasuries and collateral, it can help assets move more efficiently through the financial rules and regulations that support the markets Americans rely on every day.

For small businesses, tokenized invoices and receivables can help verify payment rights, improve recordkeeping, and unlock working capital faster.

For supply chains, tokenized warehouse receipts and inventory records improve transparency and accuracy about who owns what, where it is, and when it changed hands.

And for real estate, tokenization can help modernize one of the most expensive and paperheavy transactions most Americans will ever experience.

When a family buys a home, thousands of dollars can be consumed by the process of transferring ownership, verifying title, moving funds, recording documents, and closing the transaction. Closing costs often range from 2 to 5 percent of the purchase price, not including the down payment.17

On a $350,000 home, which is currently lower than the median U.S. average price, that can mean $7,000 to $17,500 before a family receives the keys.

While those costs pay for important protections, it should concern everyone on this Committee that the largest financial transaction most Americans will ever make still depends on a process that can be fragmented, paper-heavy, duplicative, and expensive.

Homeownership is already hard enough, especially for first-time buyers. Fannie Mae has found that closing costs are a meaningful obstacle for first-time and low-income homebuyers. In an analysis of approximately 1.1 million home purchase loans acquired in 2020, Fannie Mae found that more than 14 percent of low-income first-time homebuyers had closing costs equal to or exceeding their down payment.18

Modernizing record-keeping, including proof of ownership, transferring value, and settling transactions, are a few ways to make life easier for our neighbors through transparency, reducing duplicative verification, improving auditability, and expanding efficient pathways for transferring interests in assets, rights, and records.

Beyond lowering costs, tokenization can be a key to unlocking access to ownership by reducing the cost of entry for large-scale investments.

Fractional ownership, when properly regulated, can allow participation in smaller increments while preserving investor protections, disclosures, custody standards, suitability requirements, transfer restrictions, and market integrity rules.

That expands wealth-building opportunities beyond those with existing wealth. Though not yet operating at a national scale, the potential is easy to see in the efforts made so far to tokenize and offer small shares for investors to buy and hold.
Major financial institutions, asset managers, technology companies, and market participants are already building toward a more efficient model for issuing, owning, transferring, and administering assets, rights, and records. Citi Institute projected in June 2026 that the global tokenized asset market could grow from approximately $17 billion today to $5.5 trillion by 2030.19 McKinsey has estimated that tokenized market capitalization could reach approximately $2 trillion by 2030, excluding cryptocurrencies and stablecoins.20

Those projections are not a guarantee. They show where markets are moving. A critical question that only Congress can answer is whether that activity will happen under U.S. rules, with U.S. regulators serving U.S. consumers and businesses, or whether it will move offshore.

Regulators are now implementing the GENIUS Act through rules governing issuer supervision, reserve standards, custodial and safekeeping requirements, Bank Secrecy Act obligations, sanctions compliance, and customer identification requirements.21

The GENIUS Act was a major bipartisan accomplishment. It showed that Congress can create clear rules for digital assets that support innovation, protect consumers, and give regulators the tools they need.

And we recognize the heavy lifting this committee has continued to do to ensure consumers, innovators, and regulators can build onshore with confidence.

On May 14, 2026, this Committee advanced the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act by a bipartisan vote of 15 to 9.22 That vote matters because market structure is the foundation for responsible digital asset innovation, and because digital asset regulation should not be partisan.

A clear market structure framework will define who the primary regulator is for what kind of token, what disclosures are required, how intermediaries must operate, how customer assets are protected, and how illicit activity is policed.

This matters for affordability because uncertainty carries a real cost. Muddy, antiquated regulations push responsible companies to divert resources from product development to legal and compliance, and cause banks and regulated financial institutions to hesitate to engage in emerging and more efficient products. Consumers are left with fewer regulated options, and regulators are forced to oversee a market without clear statutory tools.

The better approach is clear, durable law: a framework that defines regulatory authority, and gives innovators commonsense rules and obligations to ensure consumers can confidently participate in the market and have long-term protections.

Digital assets are not a silver bullet for affordability, but they are a practical tool for reducing financial friction.

Digital assets can help lower those costs, but only if Congress provides the clarity needed to build responsibly.

The Digital Chamber and our members are committed to supporting fair, responsible regulation. We support strong consumer protections with clear rules for market participants and innovators. Such a framework encourages and supports innovation in the United States.

If you have any questions, please reach out to press@digitalchamber.org.

Latin America’s Surge in the Global Race to Adopt Stablecoins

The GENIUS Act established the first federal framework for stablecoin issuance in the U.S. in July 2025. In the year since, stablecoin transfer volume has reached roughly $4.5T in Q1 2026. Latin American countries are seeing that success and are working to establish regulations that will likely fuel more crypto adoption in traditional finance in the region. Notably: 

  • Brazil was among the first Latin American countries to adopt such regulations through its “Virtual Assets Law.”  
  • Bolivia reversed its decade-long crypto ban in June 2024. 
  • Argentina introduced mandatory exchange registration in 2025, and many more frameworks are being developed in these markets.  

As adoption and regulation of stablecoins have pushed Latin America’s crypto market into more commercial use cases, 71% of Latin American institutions have already begun using stablecoins for cross-border payments, the highest regional adoption rate globally. Additionally, on-chain crypto volume in the region rose 60% year-over-year in 2025, driven largely by stablecoins.  

While the drivers of adoption differ, the common effect is that in 2025, there was $324 billion in stablecoin transaction volume across LATAM, representing an 89% year-over-year surge. In Brazil, currently over 90% of all crypto flows are stablecoin-related, and over 60% in Argentina. Hotels, restaurants, and tourism businesses are also beginning to accept stablecoin payments directly from international visitors, saving both businesses and tourists millions previously lost to exchange rates and credit card fees. 

Business-to-business (B2B) stablecoin volumes grew 30x globally in the past two years, and Latin American businesses, banks, and fintechs have been among the first to widely adopt stablecoins.  

  • Mizuho research reports that remittance fees via stablecoins in the US-Mexico corridor are now under 1%, a major improvement for consumers compared to the 5% to 7% average fees charged by traditional money transfer services.  
  • Across the $142 billion that U.S. individuals sent to Latin America in 2025, if conducted through low-cost stablecoin infrastructure, this could result in $6.1-8.9 billion in consumer savings. 

As regulations become clearer and adoption continues to grow, stablecoins are likely to play an increasingly important role in payments, savings, and cross-border transfers throughout Latin America.